4.0!!!

Woohoo!! I just found out that I (FINALLY) got my 4.0. As some of you may know previous to this past semester I tried very hard to get that perfect 4, but was twice eluded by a single A-. It is a very satisfying feeling to have finally achieved this goal of mine, especially since this was my last semester at Ave.

Anyways... I am currently applying to Steubenville. Developing...

Masculinity and Femininity

Matthew Ryan
Issues of the Age
Dr. Fedoryka


Masculinity and Femininity


Much confusion regarding the issue of “homosexual unions” plagues Catholics and Christians today. The criticism of the so-called homosexual “unions” thus far has been mostly based upon theological or biological arguments. What is really needed to illumine the error of “homosexual unions” is a sound and accurate understanding of what it means to be a person and specifically as masculine and feminine persons. The common tendency when speaking of masculinity or femininity is to reduce each to a set of traits or characteristics generally found in men or women. These traits, however, stem from a deeper meaning of masculinity or femininity. Two fundamental relationships will be at the heart of our investigation of masculinity and femininity: the relationship of the human body to the personal dimension in general, and the relationship of the specific bodily difference between men and women to the personal dimension.
The exact relationship between the body and soul is a mystery that can never be exhausted, yet that does not preclude any understanding of it. The human body in general does “express” the personal dimension. The upright stature for instance expresses the dignity of the human soul. The body externalizes and manifests the interiority of the person. Likewise bodily actions can express certain spiritual acts of the person. In this sense we frequently speak of interpreting and reading “body language”. “Body language” usually refers to things such as the length of time someone will hold eye contact, the way they sit up or slouch, etc. There are, however, other forms of body language that are more than signs of the person’s psychic or spiritual disposition. The friendly hand-shake, reverential bow, the kiss of love are all examples of a body language that actually embodies a spiritual act. Somehow, the bodily action “fits” and is “similar” to the spiritual act even though they are in different orders of being. This is possible because of the body’s metaphysical capacity to carry specific spiritual content through specific bodily actions. Beating someone over the head with a rock, for example, can never be said to express the spiritual act of love. We find a certain priority of the spiritual order over the bodily order. The human being is an “embodied” soul and an “ensouled” body. The soul is always the primary principle of the human being.
Having briefly examined the nature of the body and soul on a general level we are now better able to address the relationship of the specific bodily difference between men and women to the personal dimension. Karl Stern, in his work The Flight from Woman, tries to explain masculinity and femininity in terms of the biological difference between the male and female body. He says,

“The sex organs and the sex cells manifest a polarity and complementariness in morphology and in function. In the act of sexual union the male organ is convex and penetrating and the female organ is concave and receptive; the spermatozoon is torpedo-shaped and “attacks,” and the ovum is a sphere “awaiting” penetration. That this polarity and complementariness should not be confined to the physical but also be reflected in the character of man and woman, is a view as old as history.”

The basic structure of Stern’s explanation of masculinity and femininity is that the specific bodily difference between man and woman is reflected by the personal dimension. In other words, he reverses the priority of the soul over the body. He explains the spiritual in terms of the physical. Even though Stern reverses the priority in the relationship between body and soul, he does note a valid similarity between the specific bodily difference between the sexes and the masculine and feminine soul. Even on this point of the masculine being the convex and penetrating and the feminine as the concave and receptive, he oversimplifies the relationship between the two.
In order to know how and why Stern confuses the nature and origin of masculinity and femininity it is crucial to understand that men and women as persons have a transcendent structure to their existence. The person as person has a vocation to transcendence. This is radically different from the immanent structure of animal and vegetable existence. The cauliflower, the acorn, and the dog all have their end within their being. They are “beings-for-themselves” as opposed to persons who are “beings-for-others”. This capacity of the person to be for a transcendent end, specifically other persons, puts the person in a dialogical relationship of receptivity and response. The dialogical relationship is distinctly personal and cannot be reduced to the active-passive structure of non-personal beings. Interpersonal relationship is one of receiving others and responding by spontaneously going out of oneself in a reciprocal gift of self. Receptivity and spontaneity are complimentary instances in the dialogical relationship. A receptive act is not complete until it adequately responds and a spontaneous act presupposes a prior reception. The concept of the gift really elucidates this phenomena. If someone receives a gift from a friend and stands there mute with a blank expression, can we say they have really received the gift? No, his reception is not complete until he responds with a ‘thank-you’ or some other appropriate reciprocal response. Likewise, how can a man give something if he has not first received what he gives prior to his giving? His spontaneity presupposes his prior reception. These two complimentary instances of the interpersonal dialogue frames our entire understanding of the essence of masculinity and femininity.
The essence of masculinity is a spiritual character of a human soul that “colors” all his relations in the specific mode of spontaneity. The essence of femininity is the same, but in the specific mode of receptivity. There is a temptation in the conceptualization of this insight to equate spontaneity with masculinity and receptivity with femininity. The fact is that both men and women have the mutual capacity for receptivity and spontaneity, yet we say that men find their “home base” in the mode of spontaneity and likewise women are “at home” in the mode of receptivity. Many proponents of the homosexual cause who have fallen prey to this oversimplification of the essential character of masculinity and femininity are quick to point that there are “feminine” men and “masculine” women. Most people are familiar with “girly men” and “tomboys”. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, men can be receptive and women can be spontaneous, but they always receive as a man or as a woman.
Masculinity and femininity are not pre-determined qualities that a person either has or does not have. Masculinity and femininity are either formed or deformed in the individual person’s relation to transcendent values, particularly persons. In other words, a man’s moral character determines the formation or perversion of his masculinity. Edith Stein notes that “the vocation of man and woman is not exactly the same in the original order, the order of fallen nature, and the redemptive order.” We find the “original” or authentic masculinity in the just man that gives the adequate response to transcendent value. Conversely, we find the “fallen” or deformed masculinity in the self-centered man that appropriates and uses transcendent values as means for his own satisfaction. We find that precisely on the account of these two different manifestations of masculinity or femininity and the lack of distinction between the two, many erroneous explanations have been proposed.
One common error in explaining the essence of masculinity is the characterization of masculinity as aggressiveness. Stern says, “Man’s attitude toward nature is that of attack and penetration” and later, “Man’s activity is always in a sense directed against nature.” Masculinity, as we pointed out earlier, is the mode of being spontaneous, of springing forth out of oneself. If the man is morally righteous, his spontaneity will take the form of genuine transcendence, being for the other. No aggression or hostility is indicated in this spontaneity. If, however, the man is motivated by his own satisfaction, his ‘springing forth’ will be perverted and deformed into an aggressive appropriation of other people and his environment. Edith Stein says,

“The decay of man’s dominion is seen when we consider his relationship to the natural riches of the earth: instead of reverential joy in the created world, instead of a desire to preserve and develop it, man seeks to exploit it greedily to the point of destruction or to senseless acquisition without understanding how to profit from it or how to enjoy it.”

Stein clearly sees the specific way that man’s relation to the world changes when his true masculinity is deformed by the destructive pursuit of satisfaction.
The complementary character of the original masculinity and femininity in their modalities of spontaneity and receptivity is also affected by immorality. As Sister Prudence notes in her work, The Concept of Woman, “one of the most striking features of complementarity theories is their vulnerability towards disintegration into either a polarity theory or a unity theory.” The “unity theory” holds that men and women are essentially the same with some minor physical differences for reproductive purposes. The “polarity theory” holds that men and women are not equal, but polar opposites. Sister Prudence says that complementarity theories have a “vulnerability” to disintegrate into a unity or polarity theory. This “vulnerability”, however, is not limited to the theoretical level. The self-centered pursuit of satisfaction as the person’s primary motive deforms his relations with other persons and consequently impairs his ability to understand the proper relationship between men and women. In the case of lustful man, the gender of other people does not matter to him as long as he gets satisfaction he is seeking and he thus assumes a kind of “unity” attitude towards men and women. Paradoxically, the same selfish mode of relating to others also can disintegrate the complementarity of men and women to a “polarity” of opposites. The selfish man and the selfish woman’s self-interests clash and the proverbial “battle of the sexes” ensues. Stern speaks of a “polarity and complementariness” between men and women, but the two, as we have seen, can hardly be said to be the same thing. The confusion is understandable, however, in light of the deforming effect the satisfaction motive has on the masculinity or femininity of the person.
The complementarity model asserts the equality of human nature and dignity in both men and women, but the articulation of the person as feminine or masculine also involves a complimentary difference. Men and women alike, have the spiritual faculties of mind, heart, and will. However, the use of these faculties will be articulated in different modes by men and women on account of their masculinity and femininity. In the intellectual sphere, the man’s spontaneity manifests itself in discursive reasoning. He analyses or “breaks down” the object into its components in order to understand it and subsequently synthesize it, all the while respecting the integrity of the object. The specific articulation of the feminine intellect is its intuitive manner of grasping the object “as a whole”. She does not break the object down through analysis as the man does. She understands the object “from within”.
In the affective sphere, the woman in her femininity manifests an “openness” and a special sensitivity to the inner life of transcendent object. By virtue of her openness she is able to connect with the object in an intimate and close way, that the man does not. In the spousal relationship, she is particularly delighted by the generosity of her lover because his gifts stir or “quicken” her love for him. The affective manifestation of masculinity is a special sensitivity to justice. His sensitivity is particularly expressed in his reverence for the sacredness of the transcendent. He is also deeply touched and moved by the beauty of woman, a property which may be properly attributed to the feminine. Her beauty also engenders new life in him and enkindles a desire to serve her.
In the volitional sphere, man encounters his calling to a specific task to be done. Man’s specific capacity to “go outside of himself”, analyzing and synthesizing, indicates his unique role as master of the world. This mastery or “kingship” is a vocation of service. He is called to serve and develop what is entrusted to him, namely, women and children and the world. The man serves the inner life of the woman and child and provides them a domesticated environment in which they can develop their “inner secret” and potential. While man’s specific vocation is the service of life, woman’s vocation is to receive and engender life. The unique “openness” of her being makes her particularly suited to receive the gift of life. This call to receive life is deeper than the physical conception of new life, it extends to the reception of the spiritual inner life of those entrusted to her. Children and man, particularly her husband in the spousal relationship, are entrusted to the woman. The woman’s response to those she has receive should be one of engendering, awakening, and nourishing new life within them according to her specific feminine vocation. Having briefly sketched the manifestations of the original masculinity and femininity and their complementary character, we can now better understand the specific deformations of masculinity and femininity as we find in their caricatures.
The deformation of masculinity and femininity brings about the perversion of all the specific manifestations of masculinity and femininity discussed above. Edith Stein says,

“A woman shares with man the powers to understand, enjoy, and act; but she also shares the same degenerate desire for the possession of things through violence, a desire which falsifies, distorts and destroys. However, the Fall affected man and woman differently; this becomes clear when examining the different meaning and orientation of the three functions (understanding, enjoyment, and creativity) in the total personality and total life of man and woman.”

The analytical capacity of the masculine intellect is deformed into a destructive analysis that “breaks things down” without regard to the integrity of the object. His intellect is divorced from his affective sensitive and respect for the integrity of the object and he falls into a “one-sidedness”. “[Man’s] one-sided endeavor to achieve perfection easily becomes a decadent aspiration in itself; our desire for knowledge does not respect limits placed on it but rather seeks by force to go beyond these limits.” He “over-rationalizes” things disrespecting the laws inherent in the nature of things and falls prey to a “dehumanization”. Instead of following his vocation to serve life as king, he becomes the tyrant, domineering those entrusted to him. He shirks his parental duties to his children and uses women for his own satisfaction.
As Stein noted, woman’s deformation is different than that of man’s because of her unique capacities and vocation. Stein says, “woman is better protected than man from one-sidedness and from dehumanization.” Whereas man’s tendency is to be “overly rational” to the point of “heartlessness”, the woman’s tendency is the opposite. Stein says, “Her reverent joy in the things of this world may degenerate into greed, leading her, on the one hand, to the anxious, avaricious scraping together and hoarding of things for which she has no use; and, on the other hand, a lapse into a mindless, idle life of sensuality.” We have the stereotype and caricature of woman as the overly sensitive and irrational woman. Her unique disposition to be open to receiving life, devolves into a possessiveness. “The woman who hovers anxiously over her children as if they were her own possessions will try to bind them to her in every way. […] She will check their development and destroy their happiness”. In her relation to man, she becomes the seductress in order to dominate him and use him for her own selfish purposes.
We may now return to the issue of whether or not the specific bodily difference between men and women expresses the personal dimension and conclude that indeed it does. The physical and psychic structure of man and woman are the externalization of the spiritual character of masculinity and femininity. The relation or “analogy” between the masculine or feminine soul to the psyche and body can be said to have a “sacramental” character. The body is a symbol of the spirit that “ensouls” it, but moreover, the body embodies that masculine or feminine soul. Now it is apparent how the homosexual argument that “we love each other as persons” is inadequate and erroneous precisely because the human person as person is already masculine or feminine. The complementary nature of spousal love thus excludes the possibility of a spousal union between two masculine or two feminine souls. Homosexual “union” is impossible not simply because their bodies are not complementary, but because even as persons, masculine or feminine, they are not complimentary. Without the intuition and sound understanding of the essence of true masculinity and femininity the error of the homosexual argument is impossible to articulate accurately.







Bibliography

Fedoryka, Damian. Reflections on Homosexual “Union” In the Light of the “Hermeneutics of the Gift” of John Paul II. Draft, Nov. 10, 2005.

Ong, Walter J. Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989.

Stein, Edith. Essays on Woman. 2nd Ed, Rev. 2nd Ed. Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 1996.

Stern, Karl. The Flight from Woman. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965.



I pledge upon my honor that I have not received any unauthorized aid on this assignment.

Matthew Ryan

Two Papers for You

Well folks... I'm almost done with the semester. I have two more papers to go and five finals and less than a week. Earlier I posted the two papers I have finished with. I know at least a couple of you are interested in reading over them and for everyone else, they should give you a taste of what kind of thinking I do academically.



I just got back from watching Narnia. I have to say, the movie was excellent. Lewis is a genius. I felt the power of the Truth coming through the story. The story is so unabashedly Christian it's wonderful. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to see the Gospel message in the story. When Aslan sacrifices his life for the sin of Edmund, it was almost as emotional for me as Mel Gibson's Passion of Christ was. The thing that really struck me though was how beautifully Lewis portrays the dignity of being a human. We are really sons of God. We are all kings and queens of this world. Absolutely incredible. Lucy, in particular, was amazing as an actor. Her childlikeness was such a joy to behold. Anyways, if any of you have not seen it yet, please do so, for your own sake. I can't wait to read these books to my own future children (God willing).

The State and the Economy

Matthew Ryan
Political Philosophy
Dr. Muller


The State and the Economy in Light of Catholic Social Teaching


Perhaps one of the most misunderstood subjects in America’s public consciousness is the relation between the government and the economy. Many people mistakenly take for granted that our nation’s currency has its value through the decree of the State and view the Chairman of the Federal Reserve as a quasi “shepherd” of the national economy. The underlying assumption of these ideas is that the State somehow has the power, right, and duty to control and manipulate the economy. In order to gain a proper understanding of the State and its relation to the economic sector of society, we first need to understand what the nature of both the state and the economy is and what the proper end of each is. In this paper I will analyze and critique both the socialist and capitalist models of the State-Economy relationship in light of the Catholic Social Teaching of Popes Leo XIII and John Paul II. My thesis is that the State’s role and intervention in the economy should be limited to the minimum necessary to ensure the free market’s proper orientation to the common good of man and society both for moral and economic reasons.
Origin of Society and the State
Phenomenologically examining the situation of man as he finds himself, we can see that our very existence and being as man does not have our origin and cause in ourselves. We experience ourselves as given unto ourselves from a transcendent source. Our life and existence here on earth is, however, very precarious and demands that we nourish our bodies in order to continue our life. We thus have a duty to provide for the necessities of our physical life. The earth that we find ourselves is fertile and contains much potential for our nourishment. Furthermore, we experience the fruits of the earth as being for us. These fruits, however, do not simply fall into our mouths and nourish us though; the care of our life requires our labor and creativity in order to enjoy these fruits. Pope Leo XIII reflecting on this insight says: “The preservation of life is the bounden duty of one and all, and to be wanting therein is a crime. It necessarily follows that each one has a natural right to procure what is required in order to live[1]”. We see, therefore, with Leo that the preservation of our gift of life is a duty of justice and that subsequently every man has a right and a duty to work for what is necessary for his sustenance.
Having examined the state of man isolated in nature, we are now able to see how and why man enters into society and the state comes into being. One major reason why man enters into society is because procuring one’s nourishment single-handedly can be an extremely arduous task. Self-preservation is much easier if man works together with other men towards their common good. Adam Smith identified this phenomena and articulated it as the ‘division of labor’[2]. The division of labor may be summarized as each and every man in a given society limiting his work to what he does best in harmony with all others instead of attempting to survive alone. The division of labor maximizes efficiency and consequently wealth. The efficacy of the division of labor is one significant reason for the society.
Men come together in society for other reasons as well. The most important reason, however, is man’s vocation to transcendence. To be a person means to be in relation to other persons. Aristotle calls man a “social animal”[3]. Man naturally is inclined to be in relation to others and furthermore, in his encounter with the other person, he experiences a call to be for that person for his or her own sake on account of their intrinsic goodness or value.
Since men are also imperfect, they are inclined to oppose their call to transcendence and seek their own satisfaction, even at the cost of using and dominating other men and women to achieve that satisfaction. To preserve peace, order, and justice, there must be some institution to uphold these things in society. The ordering of society requires a State for the just and smooth exercise of societal functions for the sake of the common good. The State is instituted to protect every member of society’s natural rights and to rectify wrongs incurred among its citizens. Furthermore, the State serves to protect society from external threats to public security. For these reasons men see it necessary to establish the State.
Duties of the State
In our investigation of the origin and nature of state, we can clearly see that man precedes the State and that the State only exists for the good of man and not vice versa. This concept is crucial for a proper understanding of what constitutes a valid and legitimate composition of the particular form the State takes on. Since the State is instituted by men for common good of all, it is evident that the State’s duties are directed to the good of man and are limited to the reasons for which it was instituted. Pope Leo XIII says that “the foremost duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as of themselves to realize public well-being and private prosperity.[4]” Leo asserts that the scope of the State’s duties is limited to the conformance of law and government to the common good.
What then is included in the common good of man? At the most basic level, the common good entails the protection of every man’s natural rights to life, liberty, and property in addition to the promotion of the general well-being. We have already explained how man has a natural right to his life on account of its character as being given to him. As a spiritual being, man has also been endowed with three essential spiritual capacities: the intellect, the heart, and the will. Through his will, man by nature has a right to choose the good, free from any coercion. Man’s right to property stems from his possession of self. By investing himself through labor in the land given to him ultimately by God, man rightfully possesses the product of his work and creativity. The common good of man, for which the State is instituted, demands that the State above all protect these natural rights.
Pope John Paul II reflects on Leo’s understanding of the role of the State and applies it to its relation to the economy. He says,

“The State has the duty of watching over the common good and of ensuring that every sector of social life, not excluding the economic one, contributes to achieving that good, while respecting the rightful autonomy of each sector. This should not however lead us to think that Pope Leo expected the State to solve every social problem. On the contrary, he frequently insists on necessary limits to the State’s intervention and on its instrumental character, inasmuch as the individual, the family and society are prior to the State, and inasmuch as the State exists in order to protect their rights and not stifle them.[5]”

The important insight in these passages is that the State is ordered to the common good and that indicates in particular that the State assumes an “instrumental character” in its relation to the economy. The common good does not require the State to wield absolute control over the economy; the State’s role in the economy is indeed limited by the common good. The State’s assurance of the integrity of man’s natural rights allows for and promotes economic prosperity. Protection of property is a fundamental principle needed for a prosperous economy. No man will make economic transactions if they have no security that their property will not be subsequently stripped from them. Likewise men will be discouraged from making commercial transactions if there is no security from the State that the contract will not be breached. We see that aside from the philosophical principles that limit the State’s role in the economy, the basic laws of economics argue against state control of the economy.
Socialism
Having examined the duties of the State we are now in a sufficient position to scrutinize both the socialist and capitalist socio-economic models and their understandings of the State and the economy. First of all, let us examine the nature of socialism. Socialism asserts that all men are equally entitled to an equal share of the earth its fruits. The possession of private property inevitably leads to inequalities because greedy men produce much and hoard the profits for themselves so private property must be abolished. In order to ensure an equal distribution the State is must have own and control all the means of production and consequently exercises complete control over the economy. While emotionally appealing, the socialist system rests nevertheless upon a fundamental anthropological error and is doomed to economic failure. Pope John Paul II says,

“The fundamental error of socialism is anthropological in nature. Socialism considers the individual person simply as an element, a molecule within the social organism, so that the good of the individual is completely subordinated to the functioning of the socio-economic mechanism. Socialism likewise maintains that the good of the individual can be realized without reference to his free choice, to the unique and exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil.”[6]

This fundamental error of Socialism is the root cause of its failure both as a just and economically sound socio-economic system.
Socialism is a failure as a just system first of all because Socialism does not respect the intrinsic dignity of the human person in its degradation of the individual man from an end in himself to a means to the ideal socialist utopia. Man, in his dignity as a human person, has an intrinsic value that demands in an imperial manner to all who come into contact with him that he be affirmed for his own sake and not be used as a means to some other end or purpose. This principle is sometimes referred to as the “personalist principle”. The socialist State furthermore violates the natural law teaching that we have seen regarding the proper duties of the State. Man precedes the State; the State must be for the sake of man. Socialism reverses the proper priority of man before the State and subordinates man to the imaginary ideal of the State. Socialism would not only have man’s natural right to property given to the State, but also his intrinsic right to freedom in the economic sector of society.
The historic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the downfall and failure of Socialism as a powerful economic system. The economic reasons for socialism’s failure are simple. The economic failure again stems from Socialism’s fundamental anthropological error. Without a proper understanding of man, a proper understanding of the economy is impossible. At its heart, the economy consists of the decisions of individual men to allocate scarce resources. Socialism denies this authentic understanding of the nature of economics and believes that the State can artificially assign value to objects without regard to “market value”, a true indicator of an object's economic worth. The more the State interferes with the proper freedom of the marketplace, the less efficient the economy will be and the belief that complete control is a viable economic system is an exercise in self-delusion.
Capitalism
From our discussion of Socialism it seems that we have concluded that the State has no role whatsoever in the economy and that Capitalism is the ideal model. Capitalism, like Socialism, is also unsatisfactory from both the moral and economic viewpoints. Capitalism is quite a broad term and John Paul II gives us an insightful answer on the acceptability of this model based on two different understandings of the term. He says,
“If by “capitalism” is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, […] But if by “capitalism” is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious, then the reply is certainly negative.”[7]

The first sense of capitalism that John Paul II affirms is the free market system that is within a juridical framework that places the market in the service of an authentic and whole freedom of the human person. Man’s economic decisions are unimpeded by the State as long as they are in conformance with the common good of the human person. The “free market system” is a better term than “capitalism” is for what the Holy Father intends as a just system.
The other and more widely accepted sense of ‘capitalism’ that the Holy Father condemns differs essentially from the true “free market system” in its understanding of personal freedom. When most people think of “capitalism” or the “free market”, they think of freedom as pure unadulterated choice. Fedoryka says, “In this more derivative usage, the notion of freedom refers simply to the absence of obstacles or hindrances to a movement. It does not refer to the ends or goals of the movement.”[8] The name for this false understanding of personal freedom and particular brand of capitalism has taken the name of “Libertarianism”. The important thing for what I will call “libertarian capitalism” is simply the choice. Man should be just as free to buy pornography, drugs, etc., as he is to practice his religion or walk his dog. Libertarians have a “laissez faire” (‘leave us alone’) attitude to any governmental role in the economic sector. The libertarian’s “free market” means that the economy is completely autonomous and independent from any state intervention or ethical norms. The true meaning of personal freedom, however, is more than the mere choice of man and necessarily includes the proper object of choice, namely the good. The common good demands that the State respect and uphold the proper object of the individual’s choice, the good. Man’s “freedom” to choose that which is evil and in opposition with the common good ought not to be respected by the State and justice even decrees that the State intervene and disallow the “choice” against the good.
Conclusions
So what then may we say is the proper relation of the State to the economy if both socialism and libertarian capitalism are unsatisfactory socio-economic models? For many, it is either one or the other or somewhere between the two. John Paul II affirms that presenting a specific socio-economic model is outside of the scope of the Church’s competency. He says, “The Church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations”.[9] Presenting a specific model is also outside of the scope of this paper, but we can conclude on what principles an ideal relation between the State and the economy would and should be based upon.
I believe the most important requirement for a just and proper socio-economic model is an accurate and sound understanding of the freedom and dignity of the human person. The State needs to ensure the basic conditions necessary for ordering the free market to the common good and for allowing man to follow his call to transcendence in a gift of self to other persons. Both the dignity of man and his common good demand that the State respect and protect the freedom of the market. Protecting the authentic freedom of the market sometimes requires the State to intervene and punish unjust business practices. Basic conditions that employers must respect under pain of state law should include safe working conditions, a just (non-exploitive) wage, and any other conditions that respect and protect the integrity of the person, body and soul.
Since the essential characteristic of the human person is his freedom to choose the transcendent good in itself, man can work for others; he need not work only for himself and his satisfaction. A just man should be free to work for his wife and his children, for God and neighbor. The common good of all demands that this freedom be respected and revered. The State’s role is to protect and promote the common good, any and all interventions in the economic sector must be kept to a minimum, extended only as far as the good of man requires.
Some might argue that the government need not be limited to its technical duties and obligations and can do proactive social work as well, like public education, public housing, and welfare. While it is true that the State must be sensitive and especially caring for the weakest in society, there comes a great danger in giving the State more power than its strict duty requires. As the saying goes, ‘power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. Giving power to the government is a dangerous thing as history proves, and in my opinion an ideal system will give the government as little a role possible as is necessary in society. Those proactive things that “promote the common good” can be better accomplished by localized and private organizations than by an impersonal and power-inclined state.
Regardless of what shape a nation’s socio-economic system takes on, the basic principle that I believe is absolutely central is the dignity of the human person as a free agent for the good in itself. Systems such as socialism and libertarian capitalism fail to see the dignity and freedom of the person and consequently fail as moral and just economic systems. Both fail first in their duties prescribed by natural law, whether by restricting man’s freedom too much or by failing to order his freedom to the common good. They both fail secondly as efficient economic systems as a consequence of having a deficient understanding of value, subjective and objective. Socialism neglects man’s freedom to choose and his right to property and thereby steals the work of his hands before he could give it to those he loves and so dries up any desire he had to work and produce. Libertarian capitalism fails economically because it values an abstracted notion of freedom. Without the State’s role of placing that economic freedom in the service of good, the “free market” quickly devolves into exploitation and cutthroat competition that destroys itself with the mightiest business domineering and devouring any competition that would dare try to compete. I believe that the principles founded on the dignity of the person as outlined in the Catholic social teaching of the encyclicals mentioned above provide a proper and fitting solution for the basis of a just and economically efficient socio-economic system.



I pledge upon my honor that I have not received any unauthorized aid on this assignment.

Matthew Ryan
Bibliography
John Paul II. Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus. 1991.

Leo XIII. Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum. 1891.

Fedoryka, Damian. “The “Third Way” of Centesimus Annus: Is it Elusive or Merely an Illusion?.” Faith & Reason Winter 1991 EWTN. 26 Nov. 2005 .

Gronbacher, Gregory M. A. “The Wedding of Three Philosophical Traditions Toward a Refined Philosophy of Economics.” Religion & Liberty November and December 1992 Acton Institute. 26 Nov. 2005 < id="64">
[1] Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 44.
[2] Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations.
[3] Aristotle, Politics, Book I, 1253a7 (Note: Some translations use the word ‘political’ instead of ‘social’)
[4] Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 32.
[5] John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, 11.
[6] Ibid., 13.
[7] John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, 42. [My emphasis]
[8] Fedoryka, Damian. “The “Third Way” of Centesimus Annus: Is it Elusive or Merely an Illusion?” Faith & Reason (Winter 1991) [accessed on November 26, 2005]
[9] John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, 43.

St. Augustine, Free Will, and Evil

Matthew Ryan
Ancient Philosophy
Dr. Muller


Free Will and Evil in Light of the Thought of St. Augustine


Almost everyday we see and experience evil in the world, whether consciously or not. The presence of evil in the created world presents a particularly difficult problem for the philosopher. How is it that we can say that an omnipotent, perfectly good, God who is the ultimate cause of all that exists created a world in which evil is present? If God made everything and holds all things in existence, would that then mean that God made evil and consequently He is not perfectly good? How can these two apparently irreconcilable statements both be considered true? St. Augustine attempts to solve the problem by pointing out that evil can only be accounted for by the free will of the creature and so although the human will is created by God, we cannot attribute man’s decision for evil to Him. Furthermore, St. Augustine’s notion of evil is that it does not have existence, but is really an absence or privation of goodness. Therefore, the God who holds all things in existence cannot be said to even be a participant whatsoever in the evil action which falls short of the goodness proper to it. My contention is that while St. Augustine correctly identifies the free will of created persons as the origin of evil, his definition of evil as the mere ‘privation of the due good’ is in a sense true, but inadequate.
The Nature of Evil
Before we can arrive at an adequate solution to the problem of evil’s origin, we must first inquire into the nature of evil; we ask, ‘what is evil?’ The Catholic Encyclopedia categorizes evil into three types: physical, metaphysical, and moral.[1] Physical evil consists in natural disasters, misfortune, disease, and any other physical harm to man in his body. Metaphysical evil has to do with the so-called “evil of nature” where lions prey on smaller animals, a desert climate inhibits organic life, or any other limitation inevitable in the nature of the given thing. Moral evil is the type of evil this paper is addressing and will be focusing on because it is the evil that primarily accounts for the problem at hand. With this clarification in mind, we can continue our examination of evil specifically in the moral context.
St. Augustine and the later scholastic tradition hold evil in every category to be a mere ‘privation of the good’. Augustine says, “Evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has received the name “evil.””[2] At first glance this explanation of the privative nature of evil seems to be quite an understandable and attractive solution to the vexing problem of evil. Evil in this understanding is simply the absence of goodness as darkness is the absence of light or coldness is the absence of heat. According to Augustine, evil has no being in itself. Physical evil is the absence of the good of health. Metaphysically, goodness is a transcendental quality of all being and so evil is the limitation of the essence. Moral evil is the deviation from the norm of just and good action. Now we would seem to have a solution and consequently no problem in asserting that an all-good God created everything good. Metaphysically, all beings qua being are good inasmuch as they have being; everything that has been created by God has an ontological goodness or value. On the ontological level, it is true that no substance in the proper sense of the word is evil, but we still cannot yet justify the leap to the conclusion that evil absolutely does not exist. The fact, that being and goodness are inseparable ontologically on the metaphysical level does not preclude that something can be wholly evil on the moral level. We still have yet to arrive at a fuller understanding of the nature of evil and how evil can be compatible with a perfectly good God. Further inquiry requires an understanding of the origin of evil.
The Origin of Evil
St. Augustine asserts that the free will of man is the first cause of evil, saying, “An evil will therefore, is the cause of all evils.”[3] If, however, God is the cause of all things, how can Augustine say that the evil will of a created person is the first cause of evil? St. Augustine continues and points out that there is no incompatibility between these two ideas. Since God is the cause of the man, He is also the cause of his free will. The nature of the will, however, is such that it possesses the capability and freedom to be the absolute origin of an action. By his will, man is capable of freely initiating acts that are completely his own. His volitional acts are attributed to him and belong to him in an absolute sense. Since this autonomy is the nature of the will that God created in man, Augustine says, “No blame attaches to the Creator if any of his creatures does not do what he ought.”[4] The word “ought” is crucial to our understanding of the origin and nature of evil because it implies the authentic nature of man’s free will.
The concept of “oughtness” implies that by his will, man has the freedom to choose the intentional end of his action as well as the means to that end. This understanding contradicts the scholastic understanding of the freedom of the will which is also implicit in St. Augustine’s understanding as well. The scholastics assert that only one end is possible for all of man’s acts, namely the “good”. If, however, every human action is predetermined to the good then it is meaningless to say that a man ought to choose the good because by his nature he must choose the good. In light of a more personalist view of the person and through our own subjective experience, we can see that man is not determined by his nature to choose the good as the end or motive of his action. This personal freedom and self-determination of the individual consequently casts him into the realm of morality and responsibility. As the absolute initiator of his actions, man assumes full responsibility for those actions and thereby those actions which are free assume a moral character when directed to or against a morally relevant object, especially another person. It is precisely here in the will that we understand the origin of evil. By his free will, man has the capacity to be the origin of an action and moreover can also choose by the will the end or the direction of the action. If the person chooses an end that is contrary to the dignity and justice owed to the object he uses, we say that his intention and action are morally evil.
Even St. Augustine intuits the motivation of the will as being the cause and origin of evil. He says,
Possibly the evil thing in adultery is lust. So long as you look for the evil in the outward act you discover difficulties. But when you understand that the evil lies in lust it becomes clear that even if a man finds no opportunity to lie with the wife of another but shows that he desires to do and would do it if he got the chance, he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the act.[5]

Evodius, with whom Augustine speaks in the work just quoted, concludes with Augustine that “lust alone dominates the whole realm of evil-doing.”[6] ‘Lust’ in the broader context that Evodius uses may be best understood by the ethical terminology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. Hildebrand would articulate Augustine’s “lust” as the “disregard [for] the morally relevant value of a person and his rights in order to satisfy [satisfaction].”[7] An action may be objectively morally neutral. Destroying a building, for example, is by itself a morally neutral action. What would make this action morally good or evil is the motivation or intention of the person destroying the building. If his intent is to bring down the building so that he may rebuild a better one, his action may be considered morally good. If, however, the building is full of people and his intention is to kill those people, the action is morally evil.[8] Since a man freely chooses the intentional end of his action, the responsibility and culpability ultimately falls upon him and not upon his creator. The understanding of the free will as the origin of evil, which is the “creation” of the creature, largely resolves how God can still be said to be perfectly good and the source of all being.
Motivation and Evil as the “Privation of the Good”
Understanding with St. Augustine that the “evil will […] is the cause of all evils,”[9] we can now take a fresh look at the concept of evil as being the ‘privation of the good’. The notion that evil is the ‘absence of the due good’ is inadequate according to Fedoryka, who says, “Saying that evil is the absence of the due good is like saying adultery is the absence of the due wife.”[10] I think Fedoryka’s point is that the privation theory of evil only explains part of the reality. Of course the due good is absent in evil, but there is also something else involved. There is an active principle in evil which in the case of adultery would be the lust, even according to St. Augustine’s own admission. Alford argues that while St. Augustine’s concept and articulation of evil is lacking, his intuition of evil is deeper and more accurate.[11] He cites Augustine’s story of the pilfering of the pears from the Confessions as a point where Augustine really struggles with the nature of evil.[12] According to the story, the young Augustine and his fellow companions steal pears from an orchard for no apparent reason at all; Augustine says, “I did not desire to enjoy what I stole, but only the theft and the sin itself.”[13] The object of his action is not some “lesser good”, the object is the wickedness itself. In this example, we come close to that quality of “pure evil” that remains somewhat elusive to Augustine on the conceptual level. Namely, evil as the active “negation” of the good, an evil that desires the destruction of goodness because of the very fact that it is good. Understanding evil in this absolute sense is broader than the understanding of the ‘privation of good’ as simply being the ‘absence of good’. The really “evil man” does not do evil actions for some “lesser good”, he does them because he hates the good because its good.
We have arrived at the most significant shortcoming of St. Augustine’s conceptualization of evil as the privation of good. Understanding evil to be nothing implies that man always does everything for the good because he has no other alternative. Even St. Augustine himself holds that “Evil deeds are punished by the justice of God. They would not be justly punished unless they were done voluntarily.”[14] How can we say then that a man voluntarily commits an evil deed if we say at the same time he does the deed because he believes he is doing it for the sake of some good? We may not simply say that the goodness due in an act is not there, for there is actually some thing that is morally perverted and evil in itself. Is God the origin or cause of the evil? No, we have seen that the person who preformed the act is the originator. He is the initiator of the evil action. Since he is the initiator and metaphysical owner of the morally evil action, we can impute the moral character of the action to him; he is guilty. The moral character of his soul can then be said to be “in the state of evil”. We can see on this account the reasonableness and justice of the theological tenet that asserts that God condemns sinners to eternal punishment. If we hold that evil is a mere privation or absence of the good, then we must conclude that God’s criteria for moral goodness and evil is the degree of goodness found in a person. People who are not as good as they ought to be are punished because they do not have enough moral goodness in their character. Furthermore, if we hold that man always chooses the good then we must conclude that God sends that man to eternal damnation for making a mistake in his choice of means to the good.
The main problem in holding that man always chooses the good is that man can choose the object of his action not under the aspect of the good. The error stems from the fact that man can choose as the object of his action something that may possess some form of goodness or value objectively, but he does not always choose it under this aspect. Can we say that when St. Augustine was a boy that he stole the pears for the sake of an lesser good? While objectively pears may be good for me because of the physical health they bring, St. Augustine knows this is not the reason for which he stole. He stole simply to be wicked; He says, “I loved my error—not that for which I erred [the pears] but the error itself.[15] Motivation is the key to an adequate understanding of good and evil. St. Augustine rightly identifies the motivation of lust as that which “dominates the whole realm of evil-doing,”[16] but does not include evil motivation in his definition of evil as the “privation of good”.
The sin of envy really makes the positive nature of evil evident. Many people confuse jealously with envy. Jealously, it should be noted, is when a man wants to possess goods that belong to another because he does not have them. In envy, however, a man does not want what another man has, perhaps because he already possesses them, but rather the envious man wants to spoils what the other has because the very existence of that other enjoying those goods makes him feel less satisfied.[17] Desiring the destruction of another’s goods for no other reason than the fact that they are possessed by another is much more than a mere lack of goodness in his intention. The envious man is taking a positive stance against the good. We have arrived at essence of moral evil: The positive attitude and motivating principle of a free person against the intrinsically good because of its goodness. Augustine asserts that the turning away from the good is evil, but I assert that evil does not simply “turn away”, it turns against the good.
Conclusion
I think that St. Augustine rightly identifies the free will of man as the origin of evil and not God, but in his conceptualization of evil as being the “privation of good”, however, he limits himself from arriving at a more complete understanding of evil as a more active principle. I propose that a more accurate understand of evil to be something that positively exists in the will of man as a motivating principle that hates and wills the destruction of the good because it is good. Desiring the destruction of the good because it is good has an incomprehensible quality to it, which makes the investigation of the nature of evil elusive. In the face of pure evil, one inevitably asks himself ‘why?’ In its purest forms, evil is always irrational or “anti-rational”; evil defies reason. I think this ‘incomprehensibility’ of evil is the reason why St. Augustine struggles and falls short of an adequate articulation of the nature of evil. I assert that evil has both a negative and a positive aspect to it and St. Augustine only admits the negative in his definition, i.e. that evil is the privation of good. The positive aspect of evil is not ‘being’ in the substantial ontological sense, but ‘being’ as the motivation or intention of the will of a created person that actively wills the destruction of the good because it is good. I think that an adequate definition or understanding of evil must include both these negative and positive aspects of evil.

Bibliography

Alford, C Fred, “Augustine, Arendt, and Melanie Klein: The (De)Privation of Evil”, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2005), URL = [accessed on Dec. 8, 2005]

Augustine. De Civitate Dei. URL = [accessed on Dec. 8, 2005]

Augustine., “On the Free Will.” Pojman, Louis P., ed. Classics of Philosophy. 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Augustine. Confessions. URL = [accessed on Dec. 9, 2005]

Evans, G.R. Augustine on Evil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Koukl, Gregory, “Augustine on Evil” Stand to Reason, URL = [accessed on Dec. 8, 2005]

Mendelson, Michael, “Saint Augustine”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2000 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . [accessed on Dec. 8, 2005]

Sharpe, A.B., “Evil”, Catholic Encyclopedia (1917 Edition), URL = [accessed on Dec. 8, 2005]

Von Hildebrand, Dietrich. Ethics. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972.














I pledge upon my honor that I have not received any unauthorized aid on this assignment.

Matthew Ryan
[1] Catholic Encyclopedia, Evil
[2] Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Book XI, Chapter ix.
[3] St. Augustine, On Free Will, Book III, 48.
[4] Ibid., Book III, 46.
[5] Ibid., Book I, 8.
[6] Ibid.
[7] von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Christian Ethics, p. 405.
[8] NB: This is not to say that morality is relative. The action’s moral quality in some cases may be objectively relative, but the inner intention of the subject can be considered objectively good or evil.
[9] St. Augustine, On Free Will, Book III, 48.
[10] Fedoryka, Damian, Class Notes
[11] Alford, C Fred, Augustine, Arendt, and Melanie Klein: The (De)Privation of Evil
[12] St. Augustine, Confessions, Book II, Chapter iv, 9.
[13] Ibid.
[14] St. Augustine, On Free Will, Book I, 1.
[15] St. Augustine, Confessions, Book II, Chapter iv, 9.
[16] St. Augustine, On Free Will, Book I, 8.
[17] Alford, C Fred, Augustine, Arendt, and Melanie Klein: The (De)Privation of Evil

Two Books for Your Christmas List

While reading over at the illustrious "FUMARE" blog I came across these books which look like they are very worthwhile and I hope to get my hands on soon.

In particular, this book struck my attention: "The Mysteries of Life in Children's Literature". It should come as no surprise to know that children are very impressionable to begin with and the stories they hear are the major instruments in the formation and molding of their soul. Throughout their life, even if on an sub-conscious or unconscious level, the inspirations of the stories they heard as children will remain with them. This is why children's literature is one of the most crucial fronts on our present culture war. Unfortunately, it is also one of the most neglected as well.

Anyways, I would highly recommend this book to all my loyal readers. =) I will most likely update this post after I get a chance to gloss through it myself.

Have a blessed advent and may the peace of the coming Christ child be with you all.